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I4OTES.
THE RIGHT OF AN ExPELTED OR REJECTED STUDENT TO A WRIT
OF MANDAMUS.-"A parent who sends his son into the world unedu-

cated, and without skill in any art or science, does a great injury to

mankind, as well as to his own family, for he defrauds the community of a useful citizen, and bequeaths to it a nuisance." I It has come
to be recognized that a decent education is the birthright of every
12 Kent Comm. x9S.
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American child-to none can it be denied 2-and the law has been
vigilant in its effort to protect this right wherever it has been violated.
Students expelled from or denied admission into institutions of
learning have sought the writ of mandamus as a remedy from the
earliest time of its systematic use,3 which may be said to have been
about the close of the seventeenth century. 4 The English cases, however, are not very enlightening upon the subject because most of them
are decided on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction since the
appeal ought first to have been taken to the visitor of the particular
school.5 The writ was granted, on the other hand, to restore a student to certain degrees where there was no visitor.' And it was held,
furthermore, that where the law of the land is disobeyed by the
school, the court will take notice thereof, notwithstanding the visitor,
and will issue mandamus.t
In this country, quite naturally, the cases are divided into those
in which public schools are involved and those concerning private
institutions. This is due to the premise that institutions of the former class are under a duty to the public, being maintained thereby,
whereas the latter are more like "voluntary societies," s having the
right to admit whomsoever they please and to expel at any time
without cause.
The writ of mandamus directed to public schools has been
granted frequently and for many reasons.9 Thus mandamus was
'The Constitution of the United States does not mention the right or
du~y of education, but most of the states have provided for it in constitutional
provisions. Many of the state constitutions declare it as a right, "without
distinction of race, color, caste, or sex." See, generally, Voorhees, Law of
Public Schools, p. 3 et seq. (1916).
'Dr. Widdrington's Case, i Lev. 23, 83 Eng. Rep. R. 278 08D3); The
KIng v. Patrick, 2 Keb. 66, 84 Eng. Rep. R. 42, 103 (1685). In Rex v. Askew,
4 Burr. 2185, 2189, 98 Eng. Rep. IL 139 (1912), Lord Mansfield refers to
a mandamus in the time of Edw. III directed to the University
of Oxford, commanding them to restore a man that was. bannitus; which
shows both the antiquity and the extent of this remedy of mandamus."
'Shortt, Informations, Mandamus, and Prohibition, 224 (x887).
*The Queen v. Hertford College, L. R. 3 Q.' B. D. 693 (Eng. 1878).
Lord Mansfield urged that college disputes should be confined to college
tribunals. St. John's College, Cambridge v. Todington, i Burr. 158, 97 Eng.
Rep. R. 245 (i80o).
"The King v. University of Cambridge, 2 Id. Raym. x334, 92 Eng. Rep.
R. 370 (s1'o).

' The King v. St. John's College, Cambridge, 4 Mod. 233, 87 Eng. Rep.
R. 366 (1793).
'Lord Mansfield in The King v. Benchers of Gray's Inn, r Doug. 353
(Eng. 178o). See also, Abbott, C. J. in The King v. Benchers of Lincolns

Inn, 4 B. & C. 854, io7 Eng. Rep. R. z277 (1825).

'For a collection of a few of these, see Taylor, Public School Law,
172 et seq.
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held to lie for reinstatement where a pupil was excluded arbitrarily,10 or because he was a negro,11 or on account of failure in an
entrance examination of a subject which the child's father didn't
want him to study, 2 and in a case where a state college attempted
to exclude a man because he was a member of a .Greek letter fraternity.1 3 In our own state, the writ was issued against Dickinson
College, on the ground that the expelled student had not been given
a fair trial.14 It was refused, on the other hand, where it appeared
that the expulsion of the child was the'result of judgment and discretion,"1 the court saying that ".
mandamus will not lie to
control the exercise of discretion, or to determine in any way the
decision reached thereby . . ."14
Of similar import is a recent New York case.1 T A student expelled from the Albany Law School because of his expressed Socialistic views had been granted an alternative writ of mandamus to
'Jackson v. Nebraska, 57 Neb. 183 (xiS8), in which Harrison, C. J. said:
"There was herein alleged the deprivation of a valuable right for which the
damages could not be estimated with any accuracy or certainty. .
Thir record discloses no reason for the refusal to allow the relators son to
continue in the school as a pupil A reason may have existed, but it was
not shown. So far as this record discloses there was an arbitrary exercise of power or authority on the part of the faculty; a rejection of the pupil because the parties willed it should be so; no exercise of judgment or
discretion in the matter, but a mere operation or putting into effect a desire." p. x89. See also. The People ex el. Cecil v. Bellevue Hospital Medical College, 67 N. Y. xo7 (i8gi).
'Nevada v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 3
(1872), Garber, J., dissenting for the expressed reason that the races ought not to intermingle. On the other hand, a
negro plaintiff was nonsuited in an action for damages for his child's exclusion from a public primary school; there was-a public school for colored children one-fifth of a mile farther away, to which the child could have been
admitted. Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (z849). Under a statute providing that "all residents of any district shall have an equal right to attend
any school therein," mandamus was granted where a child was excluded on the
ground of his color. People v. Board of Education of Defroit, 18 Mich. 400

(if).

-Trustees of Schools v. The People ex tel. Van Allen, 87 ilL 303 (1877).
"' The State ex rel. Hill v. McCauley et al., 3 Pa. Co. Rep. 7. Sadler,

P. J., said, "Investigation such as to this ought to be carried on in such a way

as the experience of mankind has shown it most conducive to a just determination of the guilt or innocence of the jarty charged. . ...
The tribunals of educational institutions should not, in cases as the one before us,
be less regardful of these fundamental rules, which lie at the very foundation
of the administration of justice, than the courts of common law. If it appears to a court of justice, upon the proper application of one aggrieved by
the action of those who control a college, founded as Dickinson College is,
that he has been seriously aggrieved and injured upon a trial by the faculty,
not so conducted, it is obligatory upon it to interfere and compel a recognition of the rights of the complainant." p. 84.
' 8Miller v. Clement, 2o5 Pa. 484 (19o3).
T

p. 489.

t'People ex eel. Goldenkoff v. Albany Law School, 19, N. y. 349 (xg).
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reinstate him or show cause why he should not enjoy the instruction
of the schooL The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed this ordtr upon appeal on substantially the same ground as
that upon which the case of Miller v. Clement ]! was decided.' "lt
is not the office of a writ of alternative mandamus to effectuate a redetermination, by a court, of facts relating to the conduct of an expelled student, when such facts have already been decided against
the student by the faculty of a school having jurisdiction." I These
decisions are in accord with the general doctrine observed in the
granting of mandamus, where the thing sought to be ordered is dependent upon discretion and judgment.
A recent case of even more interest is that of Barker v. The
Trustees of Bryn Mawr 'ollege.2" There the student was called
before a committee comprised of faculty members, several students,
and a stenographer and inforned that she was under suspicion in
connection with certain thefts which had recently occurred in various dormitory rooms. She was questioned as to her conduct and all
that she said was taken down by the stenographer. A few days later,
she went home for the Easter holidays, having been assured that she
would be given an opportunity to explain upon her return. Shortly
thereafter, however, she received a note from the president telling
her not to resume her place in the school. The expulsion was alleged
to have been based on other reasons in addition to the suspicion caused
by the thefts. It was held by the Common Pleas Court that the relator was not entitled to a writ of mandamus. There appear to be
three reasons for the holding: first, that.the writ would be unavailing; 2 secondly, that the relation between the parties was based on
contract and mandamus will not issue to enforce duties arising out
of contractual relations-in other words, the respondent is a private
corporation; and thirdly, the court found that the relator was not
wrongfully dismissed, since the matter was given a fair and full
investigation..
. The case brings up for the first time in Pennsylvania the question
as to whether the court can take jurisdiction in an application for
mandamus when the respondent is a private corporation. A survey
"Note IS, supra.
""Unless there is proof that the expulsion . . . was 'arbitrary,'
that there was 'no exercise of discretion' or that the facts 'did not jusify the
exercise of discretion,' or that in exercising the discretion, the faculty of
this school were not acting 'within the scope of their jurisdiction," the writ
should not issue." Kellogg, J. on p. 351.
20p. 353'Common Pleas, Montgomery Co., Pa., June Term, ig2r, No. x.
" The only reason given for this statement is that the relator would not
be able to take her former place with her class because of -the'lapse of
time. Manifestly this argument is not entitled to much weight.
"The court then referred to happenings since the expulsion.
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of the authorities elsewhere shows that they are not in accord on the
subject.
In Baltimore Universityv. Colton,2" it was held that mandamus
was the proper remedy for a student wrongfully dismissed without
notice.28 The court said that mandamus was the only remedy since
damages would be inadequate and specific performance would not

be granted since there was a remedy at law, namely, the writ sought.

On the other hand, in State v. Milwaukee Medical College," where a
student had completed the prescribed cou'se of study and the college
refused to issue a diploma to him, it was held that mandamus would
not lie to compel the issuance.
The court said that an action for
damages, or specific performance was the proper remedy. The view

taken in this case was approved in Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical
2
College, 8 but expressly disapproved in State v. Lincoln Medical
College."
The Pennsylvania court said that, in holding itself without jurisdiction over a private institution where mandamus was sought, t

was following the weight of authority.!' Be that as it may, the facts
of the instant case would appear to call for a different rule and the
cases relied on by the court ought not to be conclusive. There can
be no doubt as to the establishment of the doctrine that "mandamus
is a remedy only to be applied in extraordinary cases, where there is
no other adequate remedy.",3 1 Thus, It would seem to be entirely
reasonable to refuse the writ in a case where the student was merely
refused a diploma, 2 or denied admission," for the reasons that m
the first instance he has other remedies, while as to the second it is
admitted that a private institution is under no duty to take any par"98 Md. 623, 57 AtL 14 (1904). The court in the Bryn Mawr case refers
to this as a case in which the law school, in which the appellee had been
a student, was a public institution. The case does not seem to say this, and
the argument of counsel is based on the assumption that it is a private corporation.
*mThe school refused to graduate the appellee because he did not attend
the lectures and because "the faculty did not know him."
I 2 Wis. 7 (x9o6).
3
"It seems . . . to be well settled that duties im'posed upon corporations, not by virtue of express law or by the conditions of their charters. but arising out of contract relations, will not be enforced by mandamus."
p. 13.
xs6 Mich. 9s, r2o N. W. 589 (igog).
081 Neb. 533 (z9o8).
U Citing x8 I. C. L 168. There the holding of one case, Booker v.
Grand Rapids Medical College. supra in note 28, was given rather than any
statement of the weight of authority.
' State v. Milwaukee Medical College, supra in note A at p. i2. See
also, High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 9 (x8g6).
"As in State v. Milwaukee Medical College, supra.
'As in Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, supra.
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ticular persons as students. In the principal case under discussion,
however, it is submitted that there is great force to the argument of
the relator's counsel" that it is not a case to decide the right of a
college to dismiss, without assigning reasons, a student during a
vacation, but that "having elected to pursue a course equivalent to
charging the relator with grave offenses, it was the legal duty of the
college before taking disciplinary action to give her such a hearing
as accords with the requirements of fair play and fundamental
justice."
There is no more reason why such a rule should prevail in the
case of a public school, as in Commonwealth v. McCaulcy,1 ' than
The remarks of Sadler, J.,21
where a private school is involved.
ought to apply to the latter case as well as to the former. Basis for
such a contention might be found in an Indiana case," in which the
court said: "It is true, as a general rule, that mandamus will not lie
to enforce the obligations of a contract, but a contract may create a
-elation upon which the law will impose rights and duties enforceable by mandamus."
Of course if, upon appeal, it is affirmed that the student was not
wrongfully expelled or that the investigations since the dismissal
have amounted to a proper consideration of the matter, then the
decision ought to stand. But it is not necessary to say that a court
of law has no jurisdiction over a private institution of learning. To
allow such a school to select its students is proper; that it may even
dismiss at any time-without assigning reasons is perhaps justifiable;
but to permit it arbitrarily and without a fair trial to send a student
out into the world branded a thief is not in keeping with the spirit of
American institutions.
E.G.H.
THE EXTENT OF ADmIRALTY JURIs DicrioN OvER HYDROAEROL.NES.-In this age of development it is not surprising that
the admiralty courts have been faced with a new problem: namely,
the extent of their jurisdiction over airplanes, land and water. While
purely a twentieth century invention, the possibilities of aerial transportation have already been recognized to such an extent that a constitutional amendment has been recommended, to confer on Congress
"These include Senator George Wharton Pepper.
See note 14.
The mere fact that the defendant is a private corporation has not
been considered a sufficient defense to the writ of mandaimus. The People
ex rel. Bartlett v. The Medical Society of Erie, 32 N. Y. 187 (1865).
"Contained in note z4.
" State v. Marion Light and Heating Company, 174 Ind. 6A2, 92 N. E.
731 (191).
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the power to legislate respecting aviation, in order that the law on
this subject may be uniform throughout the country.'
The argument has frequently been advanced that jurisdiction
over 2aircraft was conferred on the admiralty courts by the Constitution, attention being drawn to the broad-minded policy - of our.
Federal courts which enables the jurisdiction to be eFtended to meet
the needs of commerce as they arise, and also to the fact that
vessels are within the scope of admiralty jurisdiction regardless of
their form, construction, rig, equipment, or means of propulsion.'
As long as a craft is capable of navigation and is actually used or
intended to be used for transportation on navigable waters, it is
subject to admiralty jurisdiction.$
'Reports of American Bar Association (192) Vol. XLVI, p. 5s.
""The judicial power shall extend . . . to all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction." Federal Constitution, Art. III, par. z See 49 Amer.

ican Law Review 599.

'De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398, 467 (C. C. i815)) ; Waxing v. Clarke, S
How. 441, 12 L Ed. 226 (i847) ; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, a L Ed. 654
(1874); North Pac. S. S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Co, 249 U. S. 11g, x2s, 63 h Ed.
5io (i8).
To go more into detail, jurisdiction was originally rtricted to tida
waters; -The Steamboat Jefferson, lo Wheat. 428, 6 L. Ed. 358 (1825); The
Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, it Peters 175 (1837); but it is now held
that admiralty has jurisdiction if the waters are navigable to commerce of a
substantial character. The Genesee Chief, 12 Howard 443, 13 L Ed. 1058
(1851); Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 2o Howard 296. i5 L.
909
(1857). If the waters in question form, in connection with other waters,
a link in interstate commerce it is immaterial that they are entirely within
one state; as, for example, the Erie Canal The Robert W. Parsons, 191
U. S. 17, 48 L. Ed. 73 (19o3). *
Emphasis is also laid on the liberal interpretation of the word "vesseL"
jurisdiction being held to include dredges; McRae v. Bowers Dredging Co., 86
Fed. 344 (C. C. i898); Bowers Hydraulic Dredge Co. v. Federal Contracting
Co., 148 Fed. 29 (D. C. igo6); Richmond Dredging Co. v. Standard American D. Co., 2oSFed. 86z (C. C. A. 1913); pump boats; Charles Barnes Co.
v. One Dredge Boat, x69 Fed. 895 (D. C. x9o9); a pile driver on a scow;
The Raithmoor, i86 Fed. 849 (D.C. 1911); a derrick boat; Patton-Tully
Transp. Co. v. Turner, 269 Fed. 334 (C. C. A. 9M); and numerous other
miscellaneous craft.
The field has likewise been extended -in the case of torts; The Ply.
mouth, 3 Wall. 2o, i8L. Ed. 125 (tg6s); Homer Ramsdell Co. v. Comp. Gen.
Trans., 18z U. S. 4o6, 411, 45 L Ed. 155 (x9oo); The Blackheath, x9s U. S.
361, 49 L. Ed. 236 (i9o4); The Raithmoor, 241 U. S. 66. 6o L. Ed. 937
(1916); so that it now includes pontoon wharves. The Mackinaw, 165 Fed.
35r (D. C. i908); The Bart Tully, 25! Fed. 856 (C. C. A. 19t8).
'Benedict's Armiralty, 4 th Ed. 09io), par. 15o and cases collected.
'The term vessel includes "every description of water craft or other
artificial contrivance used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water." Act July 18, 1866, c. 2o, par. z; 14 Stat. 178; U. S..
CaMp. St. 1901. p. 4, sec. 3. Under this definition it would be immaterial that
the structure in question was neither used nor intended to be used for transportation on navigable waters, but the authorities support the text as tated.
There must be the animus navigandi; mere capability of navigation ij insuf-
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The analogy, however, between navigation in the air and on
the water is overdrawn,6 and the constitutional objections to the
unaualified assumption of jurisdiction over aviation by the admiralty
courts are insurmountable. 7 This is recognized in the only case that
has come before a Federal court in admiralty, the decision very
properly being that an airplane is not a subject of maritime jurisdiction.'
Is it, then, going to make a difference that the airplane is so
fitted out as to be able to float on the water? Apparently the New
York Court of Appeals considered this a valid distinction, for-in a
recent case 9 it dismissed a claim for damages under the Workmen's
Compensation Law on the ground that a hydroaeroplane, while
moored in navigable waters, is a vessel and that, therefore, the application of the State law is excluded. 10
While this decision cannot be regarded as surprising, in view
of the broad language used by the courts in discussing what vessels
ficient.
12,213

Salvor Wrecking Co. v. Sectional Dock Co., 21 Fed. Cas. 28r. No.
(C. C. 18;6); Snyder v. A Floating Dry Dock, 22 Fed. 685 (D. C.

1884); Woodruff v. One Covered Scow, .30 Fed. 269 (D. C. 1887); Ruddiman v. A Scow Platform, 38 Fed. x58 (D. C. i889); The San Cristobal,
215 Fed. 6x5 (D. C. 1914): aft'd., 230 Fed. 599 (C. C. A. xg16); Berton v.
Tietjin &. Lang Dry Dock Co., 219 Fed. 763 (D. C, 1915); Cope v. Vallette
Dry Dock Co., ixg U. S. 625, 30 L. Ed.
(:886).
0o

The power of Congress to regulate navigation being independent of its

power to regulate commerce, it is immaterial that the structure in question
is not engaged in commerce. Admiralty may still assume jurisdiction. The
Public Bath No. 13, 61 Fed. 692 (D. C. 89A). A forliori, jurisdiction obtains if the vessel is engaged in intrastate commerce; United States v. Burlington & Henderson County Ferry Co., 21 Fed. 331 (D. C. 1884); provided, of course, the waters are navigable waters of the United States, as
distinguished from navigable waters of a state.
'That it is not recognized internationally is shown by the following:
"Since the outbreak of war the principle of State Sovereignty over the air
has been generally claimed and, except by Germany, recognized; Holland,
Denmark, and Switzerland have consistently regarded the passage of belligerent aircraft over their territory as an unneutral act, and taken active steps to
vindicate their rights." Report of Sub-Committee of the Civil Aerial Transport Committee, January 2, x918. Aircraft in Peace and the Law, by J. M.
Spaight.
'These have been so well advanced by Dean Bogert of the Cornell University College of Law and by the Committee on the Law of Aviation that
further comment would be futile. 6 Cornell Law Quarterly 271; Reports
of the American Bar Association (igz:) Vol. XLVI, pp. 5o3, 504.
"Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 Fed. 269 (D. C. 1914).
'Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corporation, 232 N. Y. 11S, 133
N. E. 371 (1921).
" The remedy of the New York Vorkmen's Compensation Act is not a
common law remedy and hence is not among the common law remedies which
are saved from exclusive admiralty jurisdiction by the judiciary Act of 1879.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 2oS, 61 L. Ed. 1o86 (916); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. x49,64 L. Ed. 834 (i9:9).
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are included in admiralty jurisdiction, it is significant that in every
instance the courts were dealing with structures that, when navigating, actually moved about on the surf-ce of the water and, indeed,
could move about in no other way. Granting that a hydroaeroplane
must necessarily move along the surface of the water for some
'distance before it can take flight,"' and also, as pointed out in the
instant case,." that "the records of the Navy Department show that
there have been times, in transatlantic flights, when planes, abandoning the air, moved for days upon the water," the fact remains that
the only real fundamental purpose of the hydroaeroplane-its primary function-is to fly through the air. 3 To this extent, therefore, this decision must be considered as an extention of the existing
doctrine "
Assuming the rule laid down by the New York court to be the
correct one-that a hydroaeroplane is a vessel while in navigable
waters-let us see what the consequences of such a holding will be.
The jurisdiction of the admiralty depends, as to contracts, upon
the subject matter. Rights arising out of contract are maritime
when they relate to the navigation, business, or commerce of the
there must always, for at least some space, be movement
upon the water before there is ascent into the air. Jurisdiction cannot vary
as the distance is short or longer. That would require us to say that the
plane, by keeping to the water, could transform itself into a vessel, but would
leave us helpless to define the point at which transformation would be suffered. From such embarrassment of definition there is but one avenue of
escape. It is found in the conclusion that the plane is a vessel, and hence
within the jurisdiction of the aidmiralty, when it is in the fulfillment of its
function as a traveler through water, and has put aside its functions and
capacities as a traveler through air," per Cardozo, J., in the instant case. See
note 9, sura.
'See note 9,suprr.
" That a hydro-aeroplane cannot be regarded as marine property is
shown by the fact that salvage may be recovered for services to a ship, even
though the ship was in drydock at the time. The Steamship Jefferson, 215
U. S. i3o, 54 L. Ed. 125 (19o9); The Neshaminy, =o Fed. ixz (D. C. 1914);
aff'd., 28 Fed. .85 (C. C. A. i9r5).
The instant case is expressly limited .to
where the plane is in navigable waters.
"
Aircraft "are neither of the lahd nor sea, and, not being of the sea or
restricted in their activities to navigable waters, they are not maritime,"
per Cushman, D. J., in the Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 Fed. 269, 271 (D. C.
1914).

"Jurisdiction has been sustained as to a bath house built upon several
boats as a substructure. The Public Bath No. z3, 61 Fed. 692 (D. C. 1894).
This might seem to be somewhat analogous to the case of a hydro-aeroplane
in that the primary function of the craft in question was something other
than water navigation, but the court says: "The bath house was in effect
the permanent cargo of the boats. It was not permanently moored . . . but

on the contrary was designed fQr navigation and transportation."
That a hydro-aeroplae does not "navigate" on water, see notes 16 and
28, infra.
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sea. ' The question thus arises, is a contract for supplies or repairs
to a hydroaeroplane a maritime contract?"' The answer should be
the same independent of where the craft is at the time of entering
into or performing the contract, but the only contract which could
be brought within admiralty jurisdiction under the doctrine of the
instant case would seem to be one for repairs to the pontoons and
hull (if we may so term the cockpit), the craft actually being in
navigable waters of the United States at the time the repairs are
made. Repairs to the wings are to enable the craft to fly and have
no relation to the navigation, business, or commerce of the sea.
A contract for the rendition of stevedoring services is mantime. " If the time ever comes when hydroaeroplanes will carry so
much cargo that the services of stevedores will be required, admiralty
jurisdiction will attach only if the services are performed while the
craft is in navigable waters.'
Seamen-that is, all persons, except apprentices, employed on
board a vessel 1 -- have a prior claim for their wages.1t
It is neither
logical nor practical to measure the extent of an aviator's priority
by the distance his plane travels on the water before attaining flying

speed
That branch of marine jurisprudence which embraces cases of
salvage has to do with a situation which is purely maritime.21
Salvage can be recovered only for services rendered to marinc
property."2 Suppose a hydroaeroplane, while flying over navigable
'De Lovio v. Boit, 2 GalL 398 (C. C. igi5); North. Pac. S. S. Co. v.
Hall Bros. Co., 249 U. S. i19, 63 L Ed. 51o (1918); The Susquehanna, 267
Fed. 811 (C. C. A. i92O).
"Statute gives a maritime lien enforceable by a proceeding in rem for
supplies, repairs, and other necessaries furnished to a vessel. Act June 23,
1910, c. 373, sec. I; 36 Stat. L 604; 9 Fed. Stat. Ann. 346. With the exception of the case stated in the text, this statute would seem to apply only
in case the hydro-aeroplane intended to navigate exclusively on the water,
in which case, it is submitted, it can no longer be properly classed as a
hydroaeroplane.
, The Allerton, 93 Fed. 219 (D. C. 1899); The Strathnairn, xgo Fed.
673 (D. C. 1911).
"As a hydro-aeroplane is not a vessel while in the air, it is the very
circumstance that enables the stevedore to perform his services-namely, the
landing on the water-that gives the jurisdiction, if, in fact, admiralty jurisdiction attaches at all.
" Act June 7, 1872, c. 322, see. 6s; 17 Stat. L. 277; Rev. St. See. 4612.
Even bartenders are included. The J. S. Warden, 175 Fed. 314 (D. C. 191o).
"The Virgo, 46 Fed. 294 (D. C. 189) ; Saylor v. Taylor, 7/ Fed. 476
(C. C. 1896) ; The. Eva D. Rose, i5i Fed. 704 (D. C. 1907).
=Mason v. The Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch 24o, 2 L. Ed. 266 (i8o4)
Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co., 34 Ch. D. 234, 248 (Eng. 1886).
,Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., ix9 U. S. 625, 30 L. Ed. 50 (1886);
The Steamship Jefferson. 215 U. S. 130, 54 L Ed. 12S (igog); The Nesbaminy, 22o Fed. z (D. C. 19r4); aff'd, 228 Fed. 28s (C. C. A. z915); Hughes
on Admiralty, 2nd Ed. (i92o), p. 134.
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waters, becomes unmanageable and dives into the water, coming to
rest on the bottom. Should a court of admiralty award salvage for
services rendered in locating and raising the craft on the theory that
it was transformed into a vessel the moment it struck the water? It
may well be doubted if salvage could be claimed for rescuing goods
from freigHt cars which had fallen from a railroad bridge into a
river constituting navigable waters of the United States.'"
The jurisdiction of the admiralty over marine torts depends
upon the locality of the act.-' So if a hydroaeroplane strikes a
vessel, admiralty has jurisdiction of an action brought to. recover
damages, but if the plane was in flight at the time of the collision
the libellant would be limited to a suit in personam."
A passenger may proceed in rein for actionable injury received
aboard a shipu and his contributory negligence does not bar the
action. - Here again the court would often be faced with the necessity 6f making vexatious preliminary inquiries before it could proceed on the merits of the case.
necessarily
In speaking of the fact that a hydroaeroplane must
2
move over the surface of the water before it can fly, ' the court in
the instant case says that the jurisdiction cannot vary as that distance
is long or short." The conclusion is a very practical solution of the
question then before the court, but, in view of what has been saidand instances might readily be multiplied-it would seem to be still
more practical to hold that a hydroaeroplane is never within the
0
It is submitted that this is
jurisdiction of a court of admiralty.'
Government, so far as that
of
the
practice
the
not inconsistent with

practice has developed."

"Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., zz9 U. S. 62S, 3o L Ed. zo5 (1886);.
The Gas Float Whitton No. , (Eng. 1897) A. C. 337. Hughes on Admiralty.
2nd Ed. (ig2o) p. 136.
'The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 2q, 18 I. Ed. z25 (!86S); Martin v. West, 222
U. S. 191, s6 L Ed. xs9 (1911.
'The Rock Island Bridge, 6 WalL 213, 18 L F.A 753 (867).
" '£e City of Panama, 101 U. S. 453, 462, 25 L E4. io6z (1879); The
Tourist, 265 Fed. 700 (D. C. z92o).
"The Schooner Catharine v. ,Dickinson, x7 How. i7o, 15 L Ed. 233
1,-3
L. Ed. 586 (189o); The Tourist, 26S
(1855); The Max Morris, z37 U. S.
Fed. 7oo (D. C. 19o).
' Such movement does not constitute navigation in the sense in which
that word is used by courts of admiralty, for the hydro-aeroplane has not
"put aside its functions and capacities as a traveler through air."
"See note ii, supra.
' See note 16, supro.
'"The conclusion to which we are thus led is in accordance with the
practice of the government, so far as practice has developed. The Treasury
Department of the United States requires seaplanes and, hydro-aeroplanes
to be registered as vessels. The same department has held that in navigating
the water they are subject to the rules of the road. It has also held them
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Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction embraces matters relating
to the sea and to its commerce and navigation. But a hydroaeroplane
is not of the sea, but of the air; neither does it navigate the seas m
any sense of the word. Navigation means movement on water in
ships-it is the science of directing the course of vessels a-and
seamanship is necessarily involved. The taking off and landing of
a hydroaeroplane, however, belongs'to the art of aviation rather
than navigation. Maritime law was established "to regulate the dealing and intercourse of merchants and mariners, in matters relating
to the sea." 3' To include a hydroaeroplane within this jurisdiction,
therefore, be it a land or water machine, appears to be neither within
the letter nor the spirit of our constitution, nor within the meaning
of the phrase "admiralty and maritime" as understood by commercial nations from the time of the Rhodians.
R. W. T.
THE RIGHT OF A DisEAsED ALIEN WIFE OF A CITIZEN TO
ADMISSION

TO THE UNITED

STATES.-The admission of diseased

persons into the United States is regulated by the Immigration Act

of 1917, Section 3 of which provides I that persons afflicted with
a loathsome or dangerous disease shall be excluded; but Section 22
provides:2 "That whenever an alien shall have been naturalized
or shall have taken up his permanent residence in this country, and
shall thereafter send for his wife . . . - and said wife . . .
shall be . . . affected with any contagious disorder, such wife
" and precautions taken before she
. . . shall be held . ..
is admitted; the same section proceeds: "Provided, that if the person

sending for wife . . . is naturalized, a wife to whom married
. . . subsequent to such husband's . . . naturalization shall
be admitted without detention."
to be vessels within- the meaning of the Tariff Law (Act Oct. 3, i913, par.
4-J. subds. 5 and 6 [U. S. Comp. St. pars. 53o9, 53io] ; Treasury Decision
No. 36t56.) Rulings not dissimilar have been made by the Department of
Commerce. A libel against a hydro-aeroplane has been filed in the Unite;l
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and process
issued thereon. American Bar Ass'n., i92r, Report of the Special Committee
on the Law of Aviation, pp. 7, 24." Per Cardozo, J., in the instant case. See
note 9, supra.
in Yacht Repair &
A libel against a hydro-aeroplane was also filed
Storage Co. v. one Hydro-aeroplane or Flying Boat, D. C. U. S, B. D. Pa.,
No. 79 in Admiralty, i92o; but in neither instance was the court required to
decide the jurisdictional question.
" Century Dictfonary and Cyclopedia, Vol. 6, Navigation.
"Benedict's Admiralty, 4th Ed. (1g9o), par. r4o.
' Comp. St. z918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. i91p, s. 4283/4 b. Fed.,Stat. Ann.,

z9s8 Supp., p.

214.

'Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. i91g, s. 42W4 L Fed. Stat. Ann,
1918 Supp., p. 233.
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The first occasion for judicial construction of these provisions
arose under somewhat unusual circumstances: a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus was presented by a Chinese woman, born in
China, afflicted with a dangerous contagious disease, whose husband
was a native-born citizen of the United States, whereby the petitioner sought to have determined her right to admission to the United
States, under the last-quoted clause of Section 22 of the Act ot
1917. The contention of the petitioner was, that under that clause,
the wife of a naturalized citizen may enter the United States as a
matter of right, provided the marriage took place subsequent to the
naturalization of the husband, and that the rights of naturalized
citizens are no greater than those of a native-born citizen. The
court, while conceding that the rights of naturalized citizens are no
greater than those of a native-born citizen, which indeed appears
self-evident, 4 sustained a demurrer to the petition. The court
took the view that the clause, on which the claim for admission was
based, applied only to those wives of naturalized citizens "who
become naturalized through the naturalization of their husbands,"
and so found that there was no provision of law authorizing the
admission of the alien wife of either a native-born or a naturalized
citizen as a matter of right.
It is well settled that a citizen can be excluded from this country
only as a punishment for crime. But the privilege of naturalization
by marriage has, since it was first -created by Congress, s been entended only to women who might themselves be naturalized.1 And
since Chii-iese persons born in China may not be naturalized,' it is
clear the court was correct, in denominating the petitioner as the
alien wife of a native-born citizen, and that a valid distinction may
be drawn between wives of citizens who remain alien in spite of
their marriage to one who possesses or acquires citizenship, and
wives who are capable of acquiring their husband's status of
citizenship.
But the further question remains: does the statutory provision
in question draw this distinction, either expressly or by any fair
implication? The court's view that the provision applies only to
those wives of naturalized citizens who become naturalized by the
naturalization
hushands
be founded only on the assumption that such ofa their
distinction
was can
intended
to be made but this distinction was first drawn by Congress itself ; and surely no wording
vsx pore Leong Shee, 2t Fed. 26 4S D. C. Iof).
tMorse,
ni.
Treatise on Citizenship, p.
in r Look Tin Sing, 2f Fe . o5 '(C. C. 884).
i Act of Feb.
855, 10 Stat, n, t
4
p.
Rev. Star. s. ga;
Comp. Stat. got, p.
t268.
'Kane v. McCarthy, 63 N. C. 2 (89). Leonard v. Grant, 6 Sawy.
6o3, 5 Fed. x2 (C. C. i12o).
'Act of May 6, 1885,c. 16, s. 14, 22 Stat, at L. 6M.
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could more clearly embrace all wives of naturalized citizens than
that used. It cannot be reasonable, then, to assume that Congress
has, through mere inadvertence, used language in disregard of a
distinction laid down by itself in a legislative enactment. And there
is no indication, in the clause on which the petitioner's claim was
based, of any intention to restrict the operation of the clause in any
way. Furthermore, the first clause groups together "aliens" who
"shall have been naturalized or shall have taken up permanint residence in this country," and the fair inference from this would be
that the provisions of the section were intended to apply to all wives
of husbands permanently settled here. In no part of the section,
then, can an intention be discovered to limit the scope of its provisions to such wives as become naturalized through the naturalization of their husbands. So the conclusion is inevitable that the
court's construction amounts to the insertion of qualifying words
not found in the statute as enacted, and at variance with the indicated
legislative intention.

.A.
R. C.

THE POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UNITED STATES

RAILROAD LABiOR BOARD.-A recent decision of an Illinois Federal

District Court Iis of legal and public interest in that 2it construes and
affirms the constitutionality of the Act of Congress which created
the United States Railroad Labor Boaid. The question arose under
a dispute as to the powers of the Board under Section 3oi of the
Transportation Act of 1926, which provides that all disputes between
carriers and employees tending to the interruption of the operation
of carriers shall, if possible, be decided in conference between representatives of both parties. The Labor Board asserted the right to
control the selection of these conferees, claiming the right under
Section 3o8 (4), which provides that "The Labor Board may make
regulations necessary for the efficient execution of the functions
vested in it by this title:' The Pennsylvania Railroad Company
sought to enjoin the Board and its members from exercising that
right, and also from functioning as a Board generally, contending
that the act is unconstitutional if, and in so far as, it attempts to
impose compulsory arbitration. The Board moved to dismiss the
bill, contending (z) that it is an administrative arm of the government over which the courts have no jurisdiction, and (2) that the
Board had the power exercised by it. The court denied the motion
to dismiss.
Four questions were presented to the court:
(x) Can the Labor Board be sued in a Federal court? It was
held that the Labor Board, by analogy to the Interstate Commerce
Penna. P_ R. Co. v. U. S. R. R. Labor Board, et al., U. S. Dis. Ct.,

Northern District of Illinois. In Equity, No. 25x6. Not yet reported.
I Transportation Act of 1920, 4t Stats. at L. 457.-
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Commission which -was created by language similar to that which
created the Labor Board, is a body corporate subject to the jurisdic-

tion of the Federal courts, and may sue or be sued.
(2) Does the Labor Board have the right to control the selection of conferees -in the initial conferences mentioned in Section
3o of the act? The court held that it does not have this right. This
was not one of the Board's functions. The purpose of the section
was to leave to the carrier and its employees full liberty to get

together in their own way.
(3) Does the act provide for compulsory arbitration? The
court held that it does not, for the dedsions are not binding or
enforceable. They are only advisory, except in so far as their
publication may cause public opinion to enforce them. At the end
of the opinion, however, the court intimates that even if the act did
provide for compulsory arbitration, it would not be unconstitutional
on that ground.

(4) In so far as the act provides for settling disputes and
determining what is a reasonable wage, is it within the constitutional
power of Congress to regulate commerce? The court held that it is.
The whole fabric of the nation's commerce is dependent upon the
railroads. Since the "power to regulate commerce is a power to
prescribe rules by which commerce is to be governed,"s then Congress must have the power to prescribe every regulatory or governing measure necessary to keep the commerce of this country alive
and the common carriers going concerns. "If the common carrier
system of this country may lawfully be stopped for one -hour by the

carrier or by the employees, organized or unorganized, not by reason
of any necessity in the business of common carrying, but because
either party wills it, or through the disagreement of the parties, then
it may be stopped for the same reason or for no reason at all for an
indefinite time or perpetually, and the constitutional power of
Congress would be as impotent and useless as a dead hand upon the
ship's rudder in a storm." The court said that the case of Wilson
v. New," concerning the Adamson Act,3 supports the power 'ol
Congress to prescribe compulsory arbitration or to fix wages, and
that the objections of the dissenting justices in that case that the
fixing of wages on an eight-hour basis was an arbitrary exercise of
power is not present in this case where careful investigation and
consideration by a well-qualified Board are provided. -.
The case is interesting for several reasons. In the first place,
it is the first decision having-t6 do with the Labor Board. It is also
noteworthy that a court of equity took jurisdiction. In addition to
the objection' which was answered by the court in its opinion,. mx.,
' Gibbons v. Ogden,

2 U. S. ii, i95 (i82).
'243 U. S. 332, 6z L Ed. 75; (xgi7).

'Act of Sep. 3, i916, 39 Stat. at L. 12r.
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that the Board could not be sued as a corporate body, is the question as to what property right of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was at stake in this case, for there is the general rule that
equity will not take jurisdiction unless a right of property is involved. If the decisions of the Board are not binding, what propery
right of the company could be lost by the Board functioning? It
may be that the good will of the public would be lost by the publication of a decision adverse to the company. However, the opinion
does not refer to this question. A third point of interest in the case
is that the court construes the act to restrict the Board to cases
brought before it. The Board may not of its own initiative step in
and assume the control of every step in the settlement of disputes.
Finally, the case is instructive in that it decides that it is constitutional for Congress, under the Commerce Clause, to regulate railroad wages through a permanent Board. This is a new question.
The only previous Supreme Court decision on the point is Wilson
v. New, e where the Adamson Act was upheld as intended to take
care of a temporary emergency. If the decision is sustained by the
Supreme Court it will establish the landmark of a new departure in
our constitutional law.
L. H. McK.
DENIAL oF TmAL BY JuRY ix NEwLy CREATED OFFENSES.-IS
the convenience and benefit to the public resulting from a prompt
and inexpensive trial and punishment of violations of police power
regulations more imn)ortant than the prijudice to the individual resulting from his being deprived of the safeguard of indictment
before having to answer and of trial by jury when held to answer!

This question confronted the New Jersey Court of Errors and

Appeals, when in a recent case I they were called upon to decide the
constitutionality 2 of the Prohibition Enforcement Act 3 of New
Jersey, which is commonly called the Van Ness Act.
The act ' was unique in that it made Judges of the Courts of
Common Pleas, and, in certain circumstances, the Justices of the
Supreme Court, magistrates, and required them to enforce the act
in certain proceedings. It made any person violating its provisions
a "disorderly person" triable by a magistrate without a jury, and,
on conviction, liable to sentence of confinement in the workhouse,
'Note 4, 4spra.
'State v. Katz et aI.--unreported--ZCurt of Errors and Appeals, New
Jersey, November Term, decided, Feb., ix2z
'The Act was declared unconstitutional by a vote of the court on all
the judgments under review. It was declared constitutional in respect to
the denial of the right to trial by jury, which was one of the grounds of
appeal, by a vote of 6 to 5.
'Act of March 29th, 1g21, chap. io3, N. J. Laws i92za
' State v. Katz, Note I, supra.
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penitentiary or common jail,. for a period not to exceed six months

or to pay a fine not to exceed $5oo or both. The majority of the
court held that the act did not violate the section of the constitution
of New Jersey, which provides that "the right to trial by jury shall
remain inviolate" 1 and that "no person shall be held to answer a.

criminal offense unless on presentment or indictment to a grand
jury."s.
Few statutes with penalties as severe as the rnaximum of the
Van Ness Act and providing for a trial before a magistrate without
a jury only have been held constitutional." The safeguarding provisions of the State and Federal constitutions, that trial by jury
"shall be as heretofore used" 8 "shall be inviolate" and "shall remain inviolate" 20 have been construed with remarkable uniformity
to mean that the right to trial by jury as it existed at the adoption
of the constitution was to be preserved and remain unchanged.
As some of the petty and minor offenses, such as drunkenness 12 and
vagrancy, 2 were triable before a magistrate only at that time, they
were to continue to be so triable and all other crumes were to continue
to be tried by a jury."' Little difficulty is therefore encountered in determining whether a crime known to the common law is triable by ajury or not. A real problem, however, is presented when, as in the
principal case,15 the legislature creates an entirely new offense. How
is it to be ascertained whether or not an offender can demand a trial
by jury for a new statutory offense?
The question is answered by the Pennsylfania Supreme Court
by stating t.iat, "There is nothing to forbid the legislature from
creating a new offense and prescribing what mode they please ot
ascertaining the guilt of those who are charged with it." A few
other courts have adopted this view.17 The doctrine has been dis' Const. of New Jersey, Art. L, se. 7.
' Const. of New Jersey, Art. I, sec. 9.
'1Haney v. Bartow County, 91 Ga. 77o, 18 S. E. 28 (1893); Mclnemey v.
Denver, 17 Colo. 3o, 29 Pa-- 5x6 (1892)I, State v. Rogers, 91 N. J. L. 21a,
1o2 AtL 433 (1917); Ward v. State, 5 Ohio S. & C. PL Dec. 23o, $ Ohio
N. P. Or.
Coast. of Ga., Sec. 5, Art. 4.
'Const. of Ohio, See. S Art. I.
"Const. of Ala., Sec. 7, Ar&. L
"Reynolds v. State, 6x nd. 392 (1878); Tirs v. State, 26 Ala. 16
(z855); Blanchard v. Raines, 2o Fla. 467 (1884); Raymond v. Flovel, 27 Or.

219, 40 Pac. x-8 (1895).

'Trigally v. Mempiis, 6 Coldw. 382 (Tetm. 1869).
"State v. Noble, :o La. Ann. 325 (t").
"Beyers v. Con., t. Pa. 89 (867,).
" State v. Katz, Note I, .pra.
" Swartow v. Com., 24 Pa. 131 (1854); Cora. v. AndrewS 211 Pa. 1o,
6o AtL
(igos).
v54
' Tiros v.
State, 26 At. z65 (x8S).
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approved by a large number of courts"' and has been called pernicious and dangerous by text writers.-' Under our system of goveminent where the judicial branch is empowered to determine the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative branch, a rule of this
kind would seem to be an anomaly.2 0
"A sounder rule is adopted quite generally, which is to the effect
that if an offense is of the class of offenses which were triable by a
jury at the time of the adoption of the -onstitution the new offense
should be so triable and vice versa for an offense which was not of
a class triable by a jury at that time a jury trial could not be demanded now.2 1 Some courts suggest 'nature' instead of 'class'
and others add 'status' 2 and some say crimes 'fit to be tried by
jury' 2' should be tried in that manner." The process is thus given
different names blit there seems to be a tendency by all courts to
determine the matter arbitrarily. No tests or standards nor even
limitations are suggested which would indicate the reason for placing a particular offense in any certain class. The decisions generally recognize that there are two classes and then conclude that
the particular offense under discussion falls in one class or the
other. The principal case~' was decided upon the doctrine that
the class to which a case belongs should determine the mode of procedure. The difficulty which confronted the court was a test for
determining the class. The minority opinion states: "The touchstone is the Constitution, and that provides that the 'right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate.' Therefore, if the punishment denounced
is greater than that which could have been imposed upon conviction
by a magistrate without a jury at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, it can be imposed now only upon the verdict of a jury,
because it could not then have been imposed without it; and it falls
perforce into the class of cases triable by Jury." Thus the amount
of punishment is the standard for determining the class.
The majority opinion, however, states "the real underlying historically established test depends upon the character of the offense
involved rather than upon the penalty imposed. The offense must be
a petty and trivial violation of regulations established under the police
"Ex parle Wong You Ting, To6 Cal. 26, s Pac. 627 (1895); MeIneney v. Denver, Note 7 supra; People v. Kennedy, 2 Park Cr. 312 (N. Y.
A8SS).
"Proffatt, Jury Trial, See. 98.
" Marbury v. Madison, x Cranch 137 (1803).
"Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378 (z856) ; Fire Department v. Harrison, 2 H11t. 45S (z859); Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 425 (N. Y. 18p).
" Fire Department v. Harrison, 'Note 21, *uPnM.
Mclnerney v. Denvrer, Note 7, jupra.
"Plimpton v. Somerset. 33 Vt. 283 ('86o).
" State v. Katz, Note I, s-pra.
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power of the State in order that the offender may be summarily
tried, convicted, and punished without indictment by a grand jury
and without trial by a petit jury."
The idea embodied in the statement of the majority seems correct but little information is given for future guidance and the opinion itself proceeds to the conclusion that the offense is a trivial offense
to which exceptions might well be taken. The class of crimes which
were triable before magistrates without a jury before the adoption
of the constitution as stated above were such cr.mes as drinkenness,
disorderly conduct and vagrancy. They were offenses petty and
trivial in the true sense of the words, consisting mainly in violations
of regulations for the suppression of undesirable occurrences. There
was nothing particularly harmful in the violations and a large number of such violations was to be expected. Frequent violations by
the same individual were also to be expected so that a convenient
and inexpensive mode of procedure was necessary. When a citizen
may be punished by being imprisoned for a period of six months and
fined $5oo, it does seem that the offense which carries such punishment ceases to be of a trivial and petty nature and impossible of being
included in such a class. The majority opinion refused to consider
ienalty in determining the class of the offense and no doubt rejected
an important element. The opinion suggested that if punishment too
severe for a trivial and petty offense should ever be adopted it would
violate the section of the constitution forbidding cruel and unusual
punishments. But punishments might well be incommensurate and
too severe and yet not be cruel and unusual. Surely, the penalty
should be an element of consideration in determining the class of the
offense. The Massachusetts courts hold a penalty of imprisonment
in a state prison makes a crime infamous under the constitution ot
that state and thus gives the offender the right to trial by jury." The
federal courts have adopted a similar rule.2t The punishment, however, cannot serve as the sole test, as the punishment for attempts
to commit some crimes is the same as for the commission of the
crimes themselves."
A workable rule might well be established for determining the
class of the offense which gives consideration to the punishment provided by the statute, the moral turpitude involved and the regard of
the public for the offender's criminality and immorality. It is submitted such a rule will neither prejudice the rights of the individual
nor burden the state with excessive procedure in the enforcement of
its police regulations.
P.1P. T.
"Jones v. Robins, 8 Gray 329 (Mass. 1857).
'Callan v. Wilson, T2 U. S. s4o (1887).
*Act 186o March 3T, Sec. z37, P. L 382 (Pa.).
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CLAims IN Am.RALTY AGAiNsr A GOVERNMENT.--The Pesaro,

owned and operated by the Italian Government as a merchant ship
carrying passengers and cargo for hire, was libeled in admiralty in
a United States District Court by a shipper to enforce a claim for
damages. It was held liable to arrest. The court based its decision
on two grounds. First, in its opinion, as a general rule the immunity
from suit of a sovereign state does not make its merchant ships immune. Secondly, although the immunity might ordinarily exist, the
Italian Kingdom by its action of giving to its government-owned merchant ships the capacity to be sued in the courts of Italy, stripped
The Pesaro of its sovereign character and waived the immunity it
might otherwise have claimed in our courts."
It has long 8 been an axiom of the Common law that the sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without his consent., This
sovereign privilege attaches to the government as well, whether it be
a monarchy or 4irepublic. And although a ruler has complete jurisdiction over his own domain, by tacit understanding among the nations of the earth each sovereign I grants to the persons, ministers
and armed forces of the others special immunity from suit while
within his realm.6 The nonsuability of a sovereign in his own courts
is based either on the logical ground that the capacity to be sued
would be inconsistent with the idea of supreme power, or on the
1-7 Fed. Rep. 473 (D. C. 192z).
'This secon4 ground seems open to attack. It would seem that a ship,
stripped of its immunity in one court, is not necessarily stripped of it in all
courts as thougb immunity were like a coat of paint.
"As to whether there ever was a time when the English sovereign could

be sued at Common law, see Briggs v.Light Boats, zxAll. is7, i66-x70 (Mass,

z865).

'United St4tes v.Lee, xo6 U. S. 196, o, 27 L Ed. 171. 126 (1882);
Briggs v. Light Boats, supra in note 3, at p. x6. "As the United States
are not suable .fcommon right, the party who institutes such suit must
bring his case within the authority of some act of Congress, or the court
cannot exercise jurisdiction over it": United States v. Clark, 8 Pet. 436,
444, 8 L. Ed iota, zoo4 (U. S. z834).
*Only caseg under the law of England and the United States are cODsidered here. There is a difference of opinion among Continental jurists as
to the extent to which immunity of a foreign sovereign should be accorded.
See the supplemental opinion in The Pesaro, supra in note x, at p. 483.
"The Parlement Beige, L. R. (i879) S P. D. z97; The Schooner Exchange, 7 Cranch Ix6, 3 1- Ed. 287 (U. S. 1812); Hassard v. United States
of Mexico, 29 Misc. 511, 61 N. Y. Supp. g39 (8g).
'Briggs v. Light Boats, supra in note 3. 'It is inherent in the nature
of sovereignty not to be amenable to a suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practise of all mankind."
Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. LXXXI. "A sovereign is
exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or absolute theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right a9
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends":
Holmes, J., in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S.349, &5i
L Ed. 834,"

836 (19o6).
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practical ground that constant suits would endanger the performance
by the sovereign of his public duties.$ The immunity from smt
granted a foreign sovereign is the result of the absolute independence
of every sovereign and the international comity which induces each
sovereign to respect the independence and dignity of all the others.
This privilege of a sovereign and his state extends to at least
some part 10 of their property, making it immune from seizure.
Through the attempts made to have enforced in admiralty claims
against cargoes and ships, the extent of this immunity of property
has been restricted within certain limits, and in The Pesaro"I the
very existence of that immunity has been questioned in the case of
property used for public purposes other than military.
When the question of the liability of a foreign ship first arose
in this country, a French warship was held to be immune from attachment1 2 Emphasis seems to have been laid on the fact that a
part of a foreign sovereign's armed forces was being dealt with, but
the court's language has been construed as stressing rather merely
the fact of sovereign ownership. The Massachusetts case of Briggs
v.Light Boats Isand the English case of The ParlementBeIge "Itake
this view. The latter decision settled definitely as law in England
that a merchant ship operated by a foreign government cannot be attached in rem. Such attachment, it is said, is an indirect way of
impleading the sovereign and cannot be permitted19 No recognized
sovereign state, therefore, may be sued or its merchant ships be at$Briggs v. Light Boats. 4upra in note 3; The Siren, 7 Wall. 252 154 ig
Ed. 12%, 13o (U. S. x868). See also United States v. Lee, supra hinote

4, at p. 2o6.

'The Parlement Belge, supra in note 6, at p. 214; Mighell v.Sultan of

Johore, I Q.

D. (x84), 149. is3; The Schooner Exchange, jupra in note

6, at p. 136; The Roserc, 254 Fed. 154, S9 (D. C. 1918). The opinion that
the same reasons support the rule of immunity in both cases is expressed in
The Johnson Lighterage Co., No. 24,231 Fed. 365, 368 (D. C. zp96).
" There can be no question where the property of a foreign state used
for martial purposes is in its own possession. The Schooner Exchange.
supra in note 6. There is one case contra where the oroperty w not inte
government's possession. The Johnson Lighterage Co., No. 24, supra in
note 9. The great difference of opinion arises over property other than
that used for military or naval purposes.
'Supra in note 1.
"The Schooner Exchange, jupra in note 6.
"Supra in note 3.
11
Supra in note 6.
' The English conception of actions in rem is different from ours in thi

country. That fact may help to explain the difference in the, decision in the
two countries. See the note in 35 Harv. L R. 33o. (January, igr).
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tached in England without its consent 19 even if it carries on a commercial enterprise'
The law in this country has been by no means as well settled.
In Briggs v. Light Boats I" light ships owned and possessed by the
United States government were not permitted to be attached to enforce a lien. The public, rather than the military, character of the
ships was said to be the important factoriO In a dictum in United
States v. Wilder "oit is suggested that there might be a difference in
the privilege of immunity extended to war vessels and that extended
to other property of a sovereign. The actual decision was that in a
suit by the United States 2 the defendant might-enforce a len on a
cargo owned by the government but not in its possession. In The
Dazis 22 for the first time it was stated that the mere fact of ownership by the United States was not enough to make property immune
from being libeled in admiralty. Until recently it appeared to have
become settled 2i that both ownership dnd possession must be in the
state in order that its property used for public purposes should be
granted immunity. The rule applied both to the property of our own
government and to that of foreign governments.
Recently our law has become unsettled through several conflicting decisions. A Chilean naval transport engaged in a commercial
enterprise was held immune from seizure, 1' as was an Argentine
naval vessel carrying a cargo owned by private persons. 2s A cargo
"The Prins Frederik, 2 Dod. 451, 482 (Eng. ig2o) and The Athol, x W.
Rob. 374, 382 (Eng. x842), are cases in which the sovereign finally consented
to be sued.
" Young v. S. S. "Scotia, ' O[19o3 A. C. Sox; The Jassy [19o6] P. 2o;
The Broadmayite [z916] P. 64; The Messicano, 32 T. L. R. Sig (1916); The
Eolo, 2 Ir. (K. J3. D.) 78 (1918); The Gagara [1919] P. 95. The Chardeb,
L. R. (1873) 4 A. & E. s9, no longer represents the law. Immunity is not
granted where the state has not been recognized by the British government. The Annette, The Dora [i919]. p.

1os.

" Supra in tiote 3.
'?Supra in note 3, at p. 186.

"3 Suni. 308 (U. S. x838).

ftIt is important to note that it was the government which took the
affirmative actiott in this case, so the difficulty of bringing it within the
jurisdiction did not arise. So also, in The Siren, supra in note 8, permitting
a claim against a prize ship for a tort committed after the government had
seized the ship.
" to Wall. 15, 19 L. Ed. 87S (U. S. 1869).
'The Davis, supra in note 22; Long v. The Tampico, 16 Fed. 491 (D. C.
183) ; Hassard v. United States of Mexico, supra in note 6.
"The Maipo. 252 Fed. 627 (D. C. 1918) and 259 Fed. 367 (D. C. gig).
The ship was owned by the government and in its possession. The court
states that the ship is immune even though Chile has entered into trade.
The libellant's only course lies through diplomatic channels.
259

S Ilhe Pampa, .24s Fed. 137 (DL C. 1917). See also The Carlo Poina.
Fed. 369, 170 C. C. A. 345 (ig9), in which the decree was subsequently

NOTES

of munitions owned by Russia in I9x6 was held not immune. because
2
at the time of seizure it was not in the government's possessou.
In one case it was decided that a merchant ship requisitioned by Italy,
operated by its owners under government orders, was subject to a
libel in rem.1? Immunity was granted, on the other hand, to The
Roseric,2 s a British ship requisitioned for service as an admiralty
transport, owned and operated by a private citizen but under complete control of the government. And finally in The Pejaro " the
court is of the opinion that "a government ship ,hould not be immune from seizure as such, but only because of the service in which
she is engaged." If this court's*conclusion is correct, it is immatrial that a vessel is both owned by, and in the possession of, a sovereign, if it is operated as a merchant ship.
The doctrine of broad immunity of the sovereign has its opponents,' 0 and it is clear from a review of the cases that there has been
a decided tendency in the United States to restrict it.n This tendency appears particularly fitiing where a government branches out
into trade. Concerning a bank in which the State of Georgia hadi
become a partner, Chief Justi.e Marshall said: "Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives it descends
to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the
character which belongs to its associates and to the business which is
to be transacted." 32. It is admitted that through the operation of
the government's property wrongs may be done and a right may arise
in fav3r of an injured party 33-and the courts often have been alvacated in 255 U. S. 2x9, 6S L Ed.-(gz), because of lack of jurisdiction

in the Circuit Court of Appeals.

"The Johnson Lighterage Co., No. 24, supra in note 96
, The Attualita, 238 Fed. 9oM, 152 C. C. A. 43 (x916). To be immune a
ship must be "in the actual custody, possession and control of the nation
itself and operated by it" (p. 9n).
" 254 Fed. x54 (D. C. 1g9S). The court believes that the sovereign rights
of our ally ought not be subordinated during the war to individuals' rights.
The Attualita "unduly subordinates the rights of sovereignty to those of an

individual" (p. 161).
"Supra in note 1, at p. 482
"See Charles H. Weston's Actions Against the Property of Sovereigns,
32 Harv. L. R. 266; Harold 3. Laski's Responsibility of the State in England, 32 Harv. L R. 447; George de Forest Lord's Admiralty Claims Against
the Government, 59 Col L hR. 467.
"Officers and agents of the United States may be sued for the government property in their possession. United States v. Lee, supra in note4The Planters' Bank of Georgia (infra in note 32) was not immune though
a state was a partner in it. The restrictioms iu The Davisr .swfta in nota
.2, and 'he cases following it, have been noted.
" Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia. 9 Wheat. 904,
go5, 6 L E. 244 (U. S. 184).
"The Siren, jupra in note 8; Workman v. N. Y. City, Mayor, etc.,
U. S. 552, 566, 568, 45 L Fd. 317, 32A 323 (1899). In his article in re
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most insistent in expressing their confidence that the sovereign will
act justly and fairly in meeting its moral obligations.' But why
should this be recognized as merely a moral obligation? Why should
not the rule of respondeat superior apply here as elsewhere in the

law of agency? 3 s
The reasons given by the courts for the rule of sovereign inmusity 'are not as convincing to us today as they were formerly. Nor
ought this unsettled question to be settled by a mere slavish reliance
on history and logic.37 The courts must be influenced by the needs
of the social welfare, and those needs would seem most adequately to
be met by an adoption of the opinion of The Pesaro." It appears
socially and morally wrong that a great and powerful tradesman,
whosoever he may be, should be permitted while plying his trade to
cause serious injury through tort or breach of contract, for which he
shall answer only with his gracious consent.s ' Out of consideration
for the government's popularity as a business man to be dealt with by
its citizens, nonsuability appears to be an unwise doctrine. As suggested in The Pesaro,"4 "Shippers would hesitate to trade with government ships and salvors would run few risks to save the property
of friendly sovereigns," if the- must rely solely upon the good faith
of an impersonal state. In this regard, Congress acted wisely when
it included in the Shipping Act of 191641 a provision that the vessels of the Shipping Board, when chartered or leased and employed
solely as merchant ships, should be subject to the laws and liabilities applicable to other merchant ships.
Harvard Law Review, supra in note 30, Mr. Laski takes the view that
the basis of the sovereign state's immunity is the theory expressed in Blackstone's famous sentence: "The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper
thing; in him is no folly or weakness." 1 BI. Com. (Lewis's Ed. i9o2),
Chap. 7, p. 246. This appears incorrect, however; it seems rather to be due
simply to lack of jurisdiction. This is clear from the fact that claims may
be set off against the government when it takes affirmative action (see The
Siren, supra in note 8, and United States v. Wilder, supra in note 2o); also
from the fact that the government is liable where it submits to suit (see
The Athol, upra in note x6; also Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, supra in note
9, at pp. xsg-i6r).
The Athol, supra in note 16; Young v. S. S. "Scotia," supra in note x7.
"See Harold J. Laski's Responsibility of the State in England, supra
in note 30.

"See notes 7 and 8, supra.
"See The Pesaro, jupra in note i, at p. 475.
"Supra in note i.
"In this country recourse must be had to the legislature; in England,
under certain circumstances, to a petition of right. See Lord Halsbury's The
Laws of England, vol. X, part II, p. 26 (1o9).
'Supra in note T,at p. 481.
a The Shipping Act, Sept. 7, i916, c. 45!, sec. , 39 Stat. 730 (Comp. St.
1916, sec. 8i46e). See The Florence H, 248 Fed. zoiz (D. C. i9i8).

NOTES
Inasmuch as the immunity ac-cord d foreign states and their
property is said to be based on international comity which has regard
for mutual sovereign dignity,12 it might be suggested that if it is
dignified for them to enter trade and reap its benefits, it would seem
equally dignified for them to be held liable to meet the obligations
incurred. There may arise, of course, matters of national policy during a war ' or diplomatic questions in settling which our courts
would welcome and follow requests from the Executive Department.4 In thcir absence, however, the same reasons of fairness
and mutual benefit to all parties which oppose the policy of the law
supporting our government's immunity, oppose such a policy toward
foreign governments."
C. Z. G., Jr.
Supra in note 9.

'The court in The Roseric, $upra in note

28,

appears to have been in-

fluenced greatly by the fact tzat Groat Britain ,vas our ally.
'Mack, J., in The Pesaro, supra in note x, wrote to the Executive Department for its suggestions.
s As to the different methods in which a foreign sovereignty may raise
the question of jurisdiction, see Ex parte Muir, 254 U. S. _;=, 53, 6s L Ed. (xn2i). See also De Simone v. Transportes Maritmos Do Estado, 192 N. Y.
Supp. 815 (x9n).

